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Personality in Christ and in
ourselves

PERSONALITY IN CHRIST AND IN OURSELVES

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
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THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY IN CHRIST AND IN OURSELVES

I

PERSONALITY IN OURSELVES

1

I

PERSONALITY IN OURSELVES

THE object of this lecture is to take up and continue the course which I began about this time last year and the book in which it was embodied. The leading idea of those lectures was expressly described as tentative; it could not well be otherwise, because it sought for a solution of old questions in a rather new direction. On this side therefore the book invited criticism. When one is feeling one's way in any subject, it is always a help to see at what points questions are raised. Substantial help of this kind has been given me; and I have also in the meantime been trying to carry my own thought one or two steps further. The net result of this process I should now like to lay before you, in the hope that with further co-operation a further advance may be made.

I would only ask you to understand that what I am going to put before you is still very tentative. I do not think there is any heresy in it—at least not so far as the theology is concerned; I am not so sure about the philosophy. But if there is, I shall not go to the stake for it; in other words, I am quite prepared to receive correction, and that from any side.

To prove that I am in earnest in this, I have asked leave to print as footnotes some criticisms on the rough draft of these lectures for which I have to thank a friend, Professor H. R. Mackintosh of Edinburgh, who reviewed my book very carefully and instructively in *The Expository Times*. I don't mind putting my ideas, such as they are, upon the dissecting board, if by so doing I can help you to think more clearly and more truly. I am a believer in the maxim that

men may rise on stepping stones
Of their dead selves to higher things;

and to be afraid of being found wrong is a foppery to which I do not mean to yield.

I was endeavouring to feel my way, with all reverence and caution, into that great mystery which we call the Incarnation. I was endeavouring to find for it an expression which might be called modern, in the sense that it was brought into relation with modern methods and ideas as in ancient Theology it had been brought into relation with ancient ideas. And the direction in which I sought to do this was suggested by a simple consideration of the conditions of the problem. The Incarnation is the meeting of Human and Divine. But have we no experience in ourselves of a meeting of human and divine? Yes, I was inclined to say, we have such an experience. And, if

we look at it steadily enough, I believe we shall find this throw some light on the higher problem.

There was one point that seemed to come out as we contemplate those divine influences which we have reason to believe are operative in ourselves. They do from time to time make themselves felt in consciousness. But when we say 'make themselves felt', the process must not be thought of too directly. We recognize them by their effects. As St. Paul says, 'The fruits of the Spirit are love, joy, peace, long-suffering' and the like. We see the product, and we infer the cause. The 'fruits' lie upon the surface; but the working of the Spirit is beneath the surface; it takes place in regions that are beyond our observation. The influence of the Spirit plays upon the roots of our being; and that to such an extent that it does not seem too much to say that these lower regions are the proper sphere within which the Spirit of God acts upon the soul of man.¹ In this fact—so far as it is a

¹ 'When the Spirit presents and commends Christ to me, does what happens go on, properly and predominantly, in the "lower regions"? I should grant, naturally, that *all* conscious process had unconscious as its concomitant "underside" (H. R. M.).—If I may say so, I like that expression 'its concomitant "underside"'. I am tempted to think that if my friend would develop all that he himself means by it, we might be found nearer together than we may perhaps seem. In any case, the difference between us is only that perhaps I attach more importance to this 'underside' than he does. And by 'attaching more importance' to it, I mean that I regard a larger part of the psychical process as falling within it. See the next note.

fact—I seemed to see the key to the nature of the union between the human and divine in Christ.

But I willingly admit that this suggestion that I made raises many questions, and that the discussion cannot rest at the point at which I left it.

There is indeed one objection to which I exposed myself that I should like to clear away, and that I believe I can clear away, at once. More than one of my reviewers has thought that I gave an undue preference to the unconscious and subconscious states over the conscious, that I treated these states as superior in themselves. That was not at all my intention. I was simply trying to describe the psychical processes as well as I could without any attempt to construct a comparative scale of values. But it is true that I was dealing with a particular limited group of phenomena, and if I was supposed to be doing more than this the space that I gave to these might easily seem disproportionate. But I had no mind to write a general treatise on Psychology. If I left out a great deal that might naturally come into such a treatise, it was not that I intended to deny or undervalue it, but only that I took it for granted. I meant what I had to say to be added to our current ideas, and not as a substitute for them. I do not doubt that I ought to have made this clearer. But, however that may be, I shall try now to repair the fault. The purpose of these two lectures is to fill up, as well as I can, the gap that was left, to take a wider survey and to set the processes

that I described more in their place in the whole economy of human nature.

Another cause may have contributed to the mistaken impression to which I referred. I was speaking of the action and influence of the Spirit of God upon the soul. But we instinctively give to the Divine precedence over the human; and it is quite possible that I may in that sense have used language which seemed to ascribe to processes in which this Divine action was involved something of a higher dignity. But, here again, I was not deliberately constructing a table of values. If I had been doing so, I believe that I should have been more guarded; because values stand in relation to ends, and must be judged in view of this relation. A process higher in itself, may be lower in its bearing upon human life, and especially in its bearing upon human responsibility.¹ From this point of view without doubt conscious states take precedence of sub- and

¹ My friend writes: 'The objection, as it appears to me, is not against your ascribing a higher value to process in which the Divine is involved; that, probably, all would consent to. But the question rather is: In which processes is the Divine most involved, and most valuably present; and to this I should answer, in conscious processes, as faith and love.'—Are not 'faith and love', as psychical processes of which we are conscious, strictly human? I should naturally speak of them as results or products of Divine influence, and not of the Divine influence as consciously (if I may interpolate the word) involved or present in them. In my book I spoke of the index moving over the dial-plate; and I should say that faith and love were what the index pointed to, but not the weight or force by which it is moved; that is hidden below out of sight.

unconscious. It is in the light of day that those decisions are taken which leave the deepest mark upon character.

I quite agree that character is built up by the series of moral judgements. I never for a moment meant to imply anything else. It did not even occur to me that I should be challenged on this head. Once more, I took for granted all the common doctrine on these subjects. My critics have given me credit for being more of an innovator than I proposed to myself to be. But, be that as it may, I shall try on the present occasion to place the point that I desire to state in its fuller setting. I shall try to trace more directly than I did the relation of those sub- and unconscious motions to the whole sum of human life, and especially to that central part of it that we call the Self or Person.

I cannot ascertain that even among professed philosophers there is any generally accepted doctrine of Personality. A German friend whom I can implicitly trust tells me that there is no monograph on this subject in German. The most direct discussion of the subject that I can find, from the point of view from which I am approaching it, is an essay by the late Professor William Wallace in the volume of collected *Lectures and Essays* published after his lamented death in 1898. Unfortunately, this essay was not even written for publication, and it had not the advantage of revision by its author. It is evidently the work of a real philosopher, which is

far more than I can pretend to be myself. Still I confess that the essay makes upon me the impression—and in the circumstances it is perhaps not surprising that it should do so—that it is rather what might be called the rough copy for an article, than a finished piece of work. Ideas run into each other without sufficient discrimination; and there seems to me to be a want of articulate construction about the whole. I do not doubt that the second draft would have differed considerably from the first.

I have read with much interest a volume entitled *Personalism* (London, 1908) by the late Professor Borden P. Bowne. This (if I may be allowed to say so) seems to be of great value on the general question of method in philosophy. If I understand the book aright, it is a plea for looking out upon the world from the point of view of personality as a whole, as contrasted with the method of purely intellectual abstraction that has been so much in vogue. To one who, like myself, is inclined to lay stress on the relativity of all our thinking, and who is content that his own thinking should be frankly relative, this point of view is very attractive. For a philosophical background to the considerations that I am about to offer, I would gladly go to Professor Bowne. But I do not think that he anywhere defines or analyses what he means by Person; he seems to assume the varied contents of the word.

More directly helpful for our purpose is the

chapter on 'Self as Ideal Construction' in Professor G. F. Stout's *Manual of Psychology* (2nd edition, 1907). Professor Stout is a clear and satisfactory writer; and I find most of what I want in his book—some things perhaps implied rather than directly stated. I hope I may be forgiven if I say—speaking purely as a layman and from the outside—that I doubt if this is quite one of his best chapters. Once again, the construction does not altogether please me; but that is perhaps because I come to it with questions of my own which are not exactly those that were present to the mind of the writer.

The writings of M. Bergson are full of subtle and delicate and beautiful remarks, and I have every sympathy with his point of view. It is possible that I ought to have found in these writings more that was directly to my purpose. But I have rather the feeling that in order to appreciate the bearing of M. Bergson's researches upon my present subject it would be necessary to possess a more complete grasp upon his philosophy than I have had time to obtain.

I am left therefore more or less to my own resources, and must make shift to do what I can—which I am afraid means entering upon philosophical ground without being a philosopher. I feel like the two men in Bunyan's allegory whom the pilgrim saw 'come tumbling over' a side wall of the narrow way that led to the celestial city. Their names were Formalist and Hypocrisy, and they

came to a bad end. I dare say that I too shall come to a bad end—though I hope not exactly the bad end that befitted those particular names. I feel too much like them, or—shall I say?—like David in Saul's armour. There is only just this to be said: I do not trouble myself, and I do not mean to trouble you, with the ultimate questions of philosophy—especially the great question of Appearance and Reality. I am content to take things at their face value. If I can satisfy myself as to what a thing means for us men as men, I do not ask to know what it might conceivably mean for other beings differently constituted or in the absolute standard of the universe. I speak of course only for myself in this; I am glad that others should take higher flights. I leave it for the future to determine more exactly than we can at present what is the real meaning of Spirit and what are the precise relations between Spirit and Matter. I assume that man is a responsible being, i. e. that there is something within him—however mysterious and (as yet) indefinable that something may be—by virtue of which he is responsible. I do not mean by this to take him out of the chain of causation, but only to contend that there must be an element in his nature which furnishes substantial ground for the practical assumption that he is responsible. And it seems to me that this substantial ground corresponds most nearly to the condition of which we are conscious in ourselves. We are, or at least

seem to be, conscious of a certain power of *initiating* both thought and action. No doubt that power is limited and qualified, the initiation is relative, and not absolute; we do not, at the point to which science has at present attained, know exactly what it means. It is possible, if we will, to analyse it away. But that is just what we refuse to do; because, by doing so, we should only be cutting away our own foothold. We should be stultifying ourselves; because a philosophy which by a straight and direct course landed its adherents in gaol, whatever else it was, would not be the kind of philosophy we want, *viz.* a guide of life.

We have such a guide, if we only take things as we find them; if we do not treat our own consciousness as utterly misleading; if we start from this apparent power that we possess of setting trains of thought and action in motion, and of judging ourselves and others by the way in which we exercise that power.

This brings me to the point more especially before me, the doctrine of the Person. I must try, if I can, to explore that doctrine a little further. I premise that I do so on the level of simple introspection—but of introspection carried out upon as wide a scale as possible. Besides the self-interrogation of the individual there is the unconscious psychology of the race. That unconscious psychology finds its expression in language. And those philosophers

are perfectly justified who, from Socrates onwards, have taken language, the common speech of the people, as their starting point. In the present case we begin by reminding ourselves of the history of the word Person. *Persona* of course in the first instance meant 'mask', the actor's mask—which covered the head and differed according to the kind of part played by the actor—and then a part or character generally. In this way the word came to denote the occupant of one character as contrasted with another, and so passed over into the law-books for the individual as distinguished from other individuals, or for 'person' as opposed to 'thing'. The slave had no legal personality. Personality as such carried with it certain rights and certain duties, the latter consisting mainly in respect for the corresponding rights of others. In the scale of being it marked the highest stage, at once of dignity and of responsibility. These two senses, the dramatic and the legal, have really had much to do with determining the later use of the word, even where its origin was forgotten. They lingered on in the background, and their presence there affected the later philosophical meaning.

In passing over to these later phases of meaning, we find ourselves brought up against a difficulty at which I have already hinted. We are agreed, I suppose, that Personality is spirit. But spirit as such is indescribable; if we attempt to describe it, we can only do so in terms of matter. We are

driven back upon metaphor and symbol. We know that we are using metaphor and symbol, and nothing more.¹ And yet the extraordinary thing is that we find we can do this. Our material language conveys a meaning which we recognize to be a meaning. I am going to use a metaphor which is so homely that I feel I must prepare you for it beforehand. I do not profess to be a philosopher, and therefore I may perhaps allow myself a little more latitude than would be allowed to a philosopher. I have found it conducive to clearness to

¹ 'I can scarcely accept the position that our conception of spirit is wholly symbol. I tend rather to say it is indefinable—that is, something so *sui generis* that while we have the "feel" of its reality in immediate perception, we cannot state it in terms of anything else. In the same way "good" is really indefinable (cf. that remarkably acute book, G. E. Moore's *Principia Ethica*). Or once again, Bergson arrives at the conclusion that freedom is indefinable. Define it, he says, and at once you are done for; the Determinists or the pure arbitrary Libertarians have you at their mercy' (H. R. M.).—This is just the difference between a philosopher and one who is not a philosopher: *sui generis* is a phrase that I really wanted; and indeed I think that I can accept the whole of my friend's language as an improvement upon my own. He is able to speak of 'spirit' in the terms appropriate to it, where I am compelled to have recourse to metaphor, knowing it to be metaphor. I am glad to see that in substance he agrees with what I said above when I spoke of assuming 'that man is a responsible being', i. e. that there is something within him—however mysterious and (as yet) indefinable that something may be—by virtue of which he is responsible. This is the sense and the degree in which it seems to me that freedom is really indefinable; there is an ultimate element in it that *as yet* we do not understand. I do not suppose that philosophers will be permanently content with this position, but it seems to mark the point at present reached.

state to myself what I conceive to be the chief point in the problem of Personality in some such way as this:—

Are we to think of Personality as (i) the pincushion *without the pins*? Or are we to think of it (ii) as the pincushion *with all the pins*? Or is it (iii) a big *black-headed pin* standing up in the middle of the pincushion and overtopping the other pins?

Those are the alternative possibilities that we must set ourselves to consider. And in doing so we must remember, not only that we are comparing spiritual things with material, but also that this pincushion of ours and all that is in it must be thought of as *alive*. We must think (as it were) of a perpetual series of electric currents passing backwards and forwards from pincushion to pins and from one pin to another, including the biggest.

This vital connexion, or inter-connexion, between all parts of the psychical mechanism is perhaps at least part of the reason for the ambiguity in which the discussion of Personality seems often to be involved. I spoke above of Professor Wallace's essay and I explained the disadvantages under which it was published. It was probably owing in large measure to these disadvantages that it seems to me to suffer from the ambiguity that I have just mentioned. I believe that we shall find in it the word Person or Self used in all three senses, but they are allowed more or less to run into each other, and are not clearly and definitely kept apart.

At the same time I think that it may be instructive, and that it may help us to clear up our own ideas, if we make use of Prof. Wallace's essay to illustrate the different senses of which I have been speaking. It will be at least a gain to have them discussed by a trained philosopher.

i. I take then, first, that way of conceiving of personality which I have compared to the idea of a pincushion without pins. I am inclined to think that some such idea as this lay behind the original use of the Greek word which came to be treated as corresponding to the Latin *persona* and our 'person'. The Greek word *ὑπόστασις* was not the first to be used in formulating the doctrine of the Holy Trinity; the Latin word *persona*, which goes back to Tertullian, came before it. But at a later stage in the discussions it was specially appropriated as a technical term expressive of the doctrine, and of all the terms so used (as compared with either *persona* or *πρόσωπον*) it is probably the most appropriate and the most accurate. There is a danger that *persona* should make the distinction implied too great, and that *πρόσωπον* should make it too little. As compared with these *ὑπόστασις* observes the happier mean. It does not emphasize so much the idea of 'distinctness' as that of 'special function'. The word *ὑπόστασις* meant originally 'ground of being', and so 'ground of (individual) being'; but we are free to lay upon the 'individuality' so much stress as we please, or as is right, and no more.

Now some of Professor Wallace's language appears to approach rather nearly to this conception of an abstract 'ground of being'. For instance this:

We begin with what may be termed 'psychological personality': the 'I' which 'is not a conception, but a mere consciousness that accompanies all conceptions'. Thus the 'I think' is a conception (or judgement) which is the vehicle of all concepts whatever. Or, as it is put in the *Proleg.* § 46, note, 'the "I" is no conception, but only a designation of the object of the inner sense, so far as we do not apprehend it under any specific character: it is nothing but a "sense of existing" (*Gefühl eines Daseyns*) without the least conception, and only represents to us something to which all thinking stands in relation.' Kant's point, it must be observed, is that the 'I' is not a thing or object among other things: we cannot put it before us as an object: if we could do so, the 'I' would cease to be an 'I', and become a Not-I. Or, as he otherwise puts it, the 'I' is not something of which we have a 'standing and abiding impression', a steady clear image (*Lectures and Essays*, p. 283).

Again, the following, also in paraphrase from Kant, is much to the same effect:—

Kant then seeks to show that the Ego cannot be treated on the same level as the mental or physical phenomena which it observes; it cannot be well or adequately described by such terms as 'substance', 'thinking thing', and the like. It is the perpetual concomitant of all mental acts, but not the single object of any: if it be made an object, it is of a peculiar sort—a subject-object. We may

to some extent consider it in abstraction from its special phases or attachments, but we ought not to speak of it as existing apart from them. We cannot take the 'I' out of ourselves and put it 'there' before us. It is true the consciousness 'I think' is a simple and unanalysable consciousness; whenever we go into further detail, we leave the simplicity of the condition of consciousness and descend into the detail of actual consciousness of this or that object. But a simple consciousness does not entitle us to speak of the simple nature of the subject of consciousness; consciousness cannot get behind itself and consider its own sense or principle. The Ego is only the 'form of apperception attached to every experience': an epithet noting the subject condition on which all knowledge depends. All the categories on which knowledge depends are only special and detailed forms of this ultimate power and principle of synthesis. Being itself the ultimate condition of all knowledge, we cannot get behind it to see its conditions. It is an irreducible and ultimate sentiment of reality, a feeling of being (p. 285).

These extracts, I think it will be felt, come very near 'the pincushion without the pins'.¹ They do

¹ My friend demurs somewhat: he says, 'Is this (i) after all? Wallace seems to guard himself pretty carefully. The Ego, he says, "is the perpetual concomitant of all mental acts." That is, there is always something else, to which the Ego is essentially relative.'—If by 'something else to which the Ego is relative' is meant the states or faculties of the Ego, then I think I can accept this as very much what I really intend, though it interferes with the clear-cut—too clear-cut—trichotomy of my illustration. I am quite prepared to regard this as only a temporary expedient, such as we often use in the process of education or self-education; we make things clearer to our minds by exaggerating distinctions, and then we come

not quite coincide with the use of the word Person in the doctrine of the Trinity, but have in them more of purely intellectual abstraction. I do not think that we shall need this exceptional philosophical use, and for our present purpose it may be allowed to drop. We shall, however, always want the Trinitarian sense of Person; and we may keep this as meaning fundamentally 'ground of being', with a suggestion of special function verging upon individuality. 'Person', in Trinitarian usage, is a mode of being which serves as a ground or basis (*a real* ground or basis) of special function, but just stops short of separate individuality. It implies distinction without division.

ii. The Kantian use at the least points to something very like 'the pincushion without the pins'. But, from a somewhat different point of view, Personality may rather be compared to 'the pincushion with all the pins'.

Human personality is essentially a unity of oppositions. And we may even go so far as to say that its special appearance is in the visible and outward sphere. As a person, we are primarily what we are to our neighbours: we occupy a certain place and discharge a certain function in the visible world. Hence a man's personality is not his mere intellect, but *his whole being*: it is more than his

back to truth by rubbing out gradually the distinctions we have made. I willingly admit that my friend's language is more philosophically correct than mine.

books, more than any definite work he may have accomplished (p. 282).

And again:

No being can be called a person who is not capable of feeling and action, as well as a mere idea of the intellect, a mere object of apprehensive judgment (p. 284).

This, too, hints at the comprehensiveness of personality: it is not merely a part of the self but it includes the whole self, whether thinking or feeling or acting. It really includes not only the conscious acts or states of the self but the unconscious, which once were conscious and have about them still the potentiality of again becoming conscious.

iii. In this broad sense Personality embraces the whole man. And yet there is a third sense in which we should say that the whole of our individual nature rather *ministers to*, than *is* the Person. There is a Self within the Self. There is a something within us which is not either foot or hand or eye, which is not either reason or emotion or will, but which binds together all these various organs and faculties in one. For personality we want something more than the mere congeries of thoughts and impulses and appetites and passions which go to make up the individual man. Personality is not a chaos but a cosmos; there must be present in it a principle of order and of unity. As Professor Wallace puts it,

a person must not be a mere drift of events upon a stage, but must also possess a power of surveying and so far controlling the stream, a power of comparison, unification, and initiative. We come back very much in this to the phrase of Leibnitz: 'Persona est cuius aliqua voluntas est, seu cuius datur, cogitatio, affectus, voluptas, dolor' (p. 273).

We might say that the acts and states described in this definition belong to the person, but do not in themselves constitute the person. Somewhere as it were at the centre of our being there is an *imperium in imperio*, a ruling principle, which reviews, co-ordinates, directs, and combines the different constituents of our nature into a single organic whole.

This whole is built up, as we might say, in several stages; there are subordinate unities as well as the one dominating principle of unity; there is a unity of the body as well as a unity of the soul and (if we care to distinguish them by an act of mental abstraction) of the parts or faculties of the soul, such as thinking and feeling and doing. The body is unified, on its own level, by the vitality or current of life which runs through it. Each distinct state or faculty of the soul—thinking, feeling, and doing—has its own unity. But these unities are diffused and not concentrated. The real point of concentration, which is also the seat of reflective consciousness, is the Person. We will once more go to Professor Wallace for an impressive picture of that ascending scale by which the Person arrives at its completeness.

The body, like the soul, is an organism: a system of parts mutually adapted, each possessing a certain independence and proper function: which however in a healthy state never actually rises to utter severance from the general. The whole adjustment in its details in the body is governed by the laws of mechanism: at no point can we say that a special principle of life, a vital principle, steps in and directs the interaction. The principle is one with its parts, it is in each part and in the whole: it is the supposed explanation of the fact that there is this solidarity, this unity which transcends and interpenetrates the separation of parts, tissues, and organs: it is the principle of equality and fraternity in the body: and also the principle of liberty. No part can encroach on another, no part can be held less essential, no part can be treated as separable from the others, without in each case inducing a perturbation of the general fabric. Each has its own province, its own right or duty; but none can permanently act in independence of the others; and all must practically experience that the general law of life, of self-maintenance of the total organism, is a principle overriding particular rights.

It is equally so in the soul, the psychical range, only that here something further seems to supervene on the mere organism. The vital principle is always engrossed in its part, and can never be regarded as an independent agent. The unity of the body is a unity of co-operation, the result of factors which work in obedience to a common law. But that common law is out of sight. In the soul, on the contrary, the very essence of the whole movement is that it rises in some degree into the light of consciousness. And the peculiarity of consciousness is that it is a whole conception or form which

gradually fills itself in detail with the fullness of its partial shapes. The unity, however implicit and potential, underlies and realizes itself in each step towards particular manifestation. . . .

This unity of consciousness reacts, if we may say so, upon the body. The body has other than the merely organic movements, which follow according to impenetrable laws of instinctive nature. The purely animal movements are governed by an idea: and the body itself is by mind transformed (1) into a sense, (2) into an instrument. It is in this double capacity that the body is strictly ours, the organ of our mind, of our intelligence and our will. The word 'organ', indeed, covers both meanings. As such the body is organized or articulated by the mind: i.e. its parts are differentiated in use and function, made to some extent independent of each other and under the direct control of each other, and capable at the same time of co-operation in executing a complex movement (pp. 295 f.).

That passage, I think we may say, gives us a more adequate conception than we have hitherto had of the sovereignty exercised by the Person, of the organizing power which the inner Self possesses over the outer.

We will illustrate this from another philosopher, Professor G. F. Stout:—

The idea of the Self includes in all but its latest and most abstract developments the idea of the body as the vehicle of perception and motor activity. There is also another powerful reason why the body should be regarded as part and parcel of the Self. The idea of the Self essentially includes the idea of its relation to other selves. But it can only exist

for other selves in so far as it appears to them in bodily form.

But however important the body may be, it can never be regarded as the whole Self or even as the most essential part of the Self. Its attitudes and movements, so far as they differ from those of other material things, appear to be initiated by something inside the organism. They follow on volitions, emotions, painful and pleasant sensations, and the like. These experiences constitute the inner Self, and the body, as it presents itself to the external observer, is their instrument, used in a way more or less analogous to that in which other material instruments are used. The contrast between inner and outer Self is emphasized by the process of ideational thinking, in which the body may be apparently quiescent, while the mind is active (*Manual of Psychology*, pp. 552 f.).

The writer goes on to compare the more primitive modes of representing the existence of the inner Self with our own:

Modern theories regard the soul as simply an immaterial substance, or identify it with the brain, or say that it is just the continuous series of conscious states themselves.

You will observe that these predicates are applied, not to the self but to the 'soul'. We do sometimes no doubt use 'soul' as equivalent to 'self'. This is perhaps to some extent a survival of Biblical usage. In Biblical times the idea of the self or person was not yet developed; the idea of 'soul' had made greater progress, and when a Biblical writer wished to speak of himself, he spoke of 'his

soul'. There is rather a play upon the two senses in such passages as 'whosoever would save his soul ($\psi\nu\chi\eta\nu$) shall lose it; and whosoever shall lose his soul for my sake and the gospel's, shall save it' (Mk. viii. 35). To gain the higher self, we may have to lose the lower; which is very much the same thing as saying that to make good, or perfect, the inner self, we may have to suffer loss in the outer self, the self of pains and pleasures. The outer, or larger, self includes both soul and body; the smaller, but dominating, Self resides within the soul, and represents its chief activities, but is not co-extensive with it.

I seem to myself to have come round to something like the big black-headed pin in the middle of the pincushion.¹ We must give it its black head, so

¹ Once more my friend puts in a word: 'I am less clear than I should like to be that any of these quotations reveal either Wallace or Stout as holding the big black-headed pin theory. Of course there is an inner unity, but is not the unity they refer to what may be called an immanent unity, a unity of and through the particulars rather than (so to speak) *over* them? This indeed is what Stout appears to say: "These experiences constitute the inner Self". For Stout "inner self", I think, is just exactly equivalent to "soul".' —That is quite true; I have distinguished between the Self and the faculties or activities of the Self, and Professor Stout does not. I shall have more to say about this distinction in the next lecture. And yet I am inclined to welcome the phrase 'immanent unity'. I am not quite sure whether it does, or does not, enable us to dispense with the distinction of which I have been speaking. I was myself far from intending to draw a hard and fast line between the Ego and its faculties. In my next lecture as well as in the im-

as to distinguish it from the other pins and to mark its superiority over them. And, as I have already reminded you, we must think of both pins and pin-cushion as *alive*, and of all the pins as equally alive. The action and reaction between them is mutual and incessant. It is only in thought, and not in fact, that the larger self is separable from the smaller or the inner from the outer. But we really want both forms of the Self, and cannot do without them. Only we ought to be clear which of the two senses we mean in any given context. It would perhaps be convenient if we were to keep Person or Ego for the inner Self, and were to add some further defining epithet when we mean the outer.

So much we may perhaps regard as established. But we have still to determine more exactly the relation of these two Selves, outer and inner, larger and smaller, to each other. And, for our particular purpose, it is important that we should examine more closely the relation of the conscious states of the Self, whether larger or smaller, to the sub- and unconscious.

mediate context I speak of the distinction between them as existing in thought, rather than in fact. I say that 'the larger Self and the smaller Self are perfectly continuous; the movements between them are movements in a circle; there is a perpetual flow and return'.

I may also explain that when I spoke of the big black-headed pin as 'overtopping' the other pins, I did not mean it in any literal or local sense; I meant to suggest the authority or command which the inner Self exercises over the outer. But about this, too, there is more to be said.

II

PERSONALITY IN OURSELVES AND IN CHRIST

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THERE is a famous passage in *Othello* which seems to me to express very well the theory of the Person. Iago speaks, and the passage is admirably appropriate in its context, which I purposely do not give though it is splendid writing, because it seems to me that for once the creator of Iago is looking beyond his own creation and laying down general doctrine.

‘ ’Tis in ourselves that we are thus, or thus. Our bodies are our gardens, to the which our wills are gardeners; so that if we will plant nettles or sow lettuce, set hyssop and weed up thyme, supply it with one gender of herbs or distract it with many, either to have it sterile with idleness or manured with industry, why, the power and corrigible authority of this lies in our wills. If the balance of our lives had not one scale of reason to poise another of sensuality, the blood and baseness of our natures would conduct us to most preposterous conclusions; but we have reason to cool our raging motions, our carnal stings,’ and so on.

This is not only written with all Shakespeare’s mastery and ease, but it also contains what I believe to be the substantial truth of the matter, though it is not quite verbally consistent, and perhaps not quite verbally and minutely accurate. The best mode of statement is the first.

’Tis in ourselves that we are thus, or thus.

Here the decisive and ultimate authority is referred to the Self. As Shakespeare himself puts it,

‘the power and corrigible authority’ (i. e. authority for correction) ‘lies in our wills’.

There we have a more popular turn of phrase, which is sufficient for Shakespeare’s purpose and which would be generally accepted and understood, but which is not so strictly philosophical. To make it this, we should have to say—should we not?—the self acting through the will. The ‘will’ is used *a potiori parte* as equivalent to the Self. And then again in like manner, when it is said a little lower down that Reason acts as a counterpoise to desire, what is really meant is not Reason acting independently, but Reason acting as an instrument or organ of the Self. Once more, the ‘corrigible authority’ belongs of right to the self, though the self acts through the medium of the reason, first setting the train of reasoning in motion and then accepting and acting upon the balance of reason. In each case—both between the will and the act and between the reason and the act—the Self or Person is interposed. Shakespeare’s statements as they stand are compendious; if they were set out in a textbook of Philosophy or Psychology, they would have to be set out in full.¹

¹ My friendly critic, of whom I spoke in the last lecture, writes: ‘I have some little difficulty about your sharp distinction—not of course separation—of the Self or Ego and the will. I like your phrasing on p. 5 better: “Strictly speaking it is *I* who will,” &c.

The same would hold good for all descriptions of the process that intervenes between conception and execution. The Self stands, or is enthroned, at the centre of the man; all impulses of passion, all judgements of the reason, come up to it for endorsement, and not until its signature is affixed can they take effect in action.

It will be observed that when Shakespeare says ‘ ‘Tis in ourselves that we are thus, or thus,’ ‘ourselves’ and ‘we’ are not identical in meaning; ‘we’ is the wider term, and ‘ourselves’ the narrower. They correspond to the two Selves of which I spoke in the last lecture. One stands for the inner Self—the Self within the Self, the controlling, authoritative Self; and the other (‘we’) stands for the larger, outer Self, all of the man that is contained within, and bounded by, the body. Of these two senses, the one includes, and the other does not include, the body and all that belongs to it. One is the garden, and the other is the gardener. The garden is divided up into many kinds of plots; and the gardener determines what shall be planted in these plots, and therefore also determines what shall be the general character of the garden.

To me the will is simply the Self in motion (of course spontaneous motion); and here lies a grave objection to Dyothelism I really cannot get over. But I go with the next two or three pages cordially.—I certainly do not intend to duplicate the will; and it is doubtless true that we do sometimes use ‘will’ and ‘self’ almost as synonyms. But, from my point of view, the will is a faculty or organ of the Self, like the reason and the emotions, it is the Self that wills, just as it thinks or feels.

The larger Self is complex; it is broken up into a number of parts—the body with its members, and the soul, so far as it is made up of different faculties or functions, such as thinking, feeling and willing. The smaller, inner Self is simple, and not compound. It is one and indivisible. I proposed in the last lecture that we should keep for this smaller, inner Self, the terms Ego or Person—or at least Ego; for perhaps we want ‘Person’, as we want ‘Self’, for both senses. In the eye of the law ‘person’ means the whole man; the ‘persons’ in a drama are the whole men and women presented upon the stage. Therefore, in the history of the word, Person in the larger sense comes before Person in the narrower. And yet, when we come to philosophical usage, the latter sense is the more distinctive. Perhaps I had better say that I will take Ego always, and Person usually, in this narrower sense. When I intend to speak of Person in the larger sense, I will indicate this by an added epithet.

The body, as I have said, is divided up into its several parts or members—foot, hand, eye and the like. Is it by a mental act that we define and distinguish these, though there are conspicuous outward and visible marks which enable us to do so. In the case of the soul, it is purely by an act of mental abstraction that we distinguish between its several states or faculties. The Ego as such is one and indivisible; and, strictly speaking, it is *I* who

think, *I* who feel, *I* who will. But in each of these cases, the act of the 'I' is passing outwards, and the larger, peripheral self (as we may call it) is very soon involved.

This reminds me that there is another aspect of the matter that we ought to keep well before our minds. Although the distinction between the two Selves is clear and strong, they are yet in fact inseparable. The larger Self and the smaller Self are perfectly continuous; the movements between them are movements in a circle; there is a perpetual flow and return.

Accordingly, while there are some functions that can be definitely attributed to the Ego or smaller Self, and others that can be as definitely attributed to the larger Self or 'whole man', there is perhaps at least one function that is somewhat ambiguous and that would seem to embrace the whole of the smaller Self and part, but not all, of the larger (see iii. below).

I will try to make out a list of what I conceive to be the leading functions of the smaller Self or Ego; and then I will add a few words as to extensions of these that seem to run over into the larger Self. I shall deliberately keep back one important function of the smaller Self, in order not to give an opening for controversy which on the present occasion I should be glad to avoid. I cannot exclude everything that is controversial; and I would remind you that I am not attempting to press all the questions

that may be raised to their ultimate issues; I just take the phenomenal world (including ourselves) as I find it; my psychology (such as it is) does not pretend to be more than that of the man in the street.

To the man in the street the inner Self or Ego, in its relation to human nature as a whole, appears to be:

(i) The centre or pivot or determining principle of *unity*. The faculties or powers of the larger Self appear to fit into it, and radiate from it, like the spokes of a wheel.

(ii) The inner Self is the thread of personal *continuity and identity*. It is the bond which connects the present with the past and which runs out into the future.

(iii) It is the vehicle of *reflective consciousness*. It has a special power—perhaps I should say in this case, in conjunction with the thinking process—of reviewing other mental processes, of (so to speak) taking down and examining the ladder by which the Self has arrived at any given point. Reason is the candle or searchlight of the soul; and the Self has the power of turning this candle or searchlight back upon its own processes.

(iv) That is one way, though an important and characteristic way, in which it possesses a special *power of initiative*. This power of initiative—however relative, and not absolute—is, to our

common apprehension, a distinct property of the Ego. When we treat the individual man as a responsible being, it is by virtue of this seeming power of initiative that we so treat him. It is the inner Self that sets in motion trains of thought or voluntary action, and that at its pleasure checks or suspends the processes that it has started.

(v) Allied to this power of initiative, is the other power of which we have spoken, *authoritative control*. The Ego is master in its own house, king over its own kingdom. It is this which constitutes its superior dignity.

This perhaps may serve for the present as a rough enumeration of the activities of the Ego.

When we think of *Character*, we think perhaps primarily of the sum of the qualities of the Ego in a moral point of view. But in this case we cannot separate the Ego or smaller Self from the faculties of the larger Self which it sets in motion. We speak of the Ego as receiving sensations, or feeling, or thinking, or willing. But each of these states or processes forms a category to itself, which we think of by itself, and which includes a very large class of activities. Each of these classes of activity has tendencies and a character of its own that can be, at least by mental abstraction, isolated from the character of the Ego. The influence of habit makes one group of physical movements, one channel or groove of thinking or feeling or willing, easier than another. Instinctively and automatically

these states or conditions seem to arise within us, apart from any direct intervention of the Ego. It is hard for us to tell whether there is or not any such intervention, because if there were it would undoubtedly act in the same direction. The Ego ends by contracting the same tendencies and qualities that in the first instance belong to its faculties. But it is not important to discriminate parts in a movement that we have seen to be continuous and unbroken. It is best to treat Character broadly as the quality of the larger Self.

In like manner *Conscience* comes to a head in the authority which ultimately determines action. It implies an habitual tendency in that authority. But that cannot be all. Conscience has a fine point, but it has also a broad base. It is based on habits gradually acquired and confirmed, and on moral judgements in the past steadily accumulated. There is not only the direct effect of these judgements, acting upon the innermost self and imparting to it a definite bias, but there also grows up by the side of this a reasoned conception of duty, a deliberate standard of obligation, which confronts the Self and claims its obedience. Thus, in the working of conscience, the larger and the smaller Self co-operate together. The smaller Self, the Person, calls in to its aid that which is best and highest in the larger Self. And, through this co-operative action of the conscience many times repeated, the sense of right and wrong, which is

the foundation of character, is educated and strengthened.

The wonderful thing in all this elaborate machinery is that there should be such complete freedom of interaction between all its parts; the various faculties and organs working together in perfect harmony; under normal conditions they never jar or collide. They form an organism; the same current of life runs through them. From one point of view we see the states and faculties of the larger Self ministering to the smaller; from another point of view the smaller Self is so deeply affected by the action and interaction of the larger that it might almost be described as a product of it.

And then there is the further wonder that when we have described the conscious half of experience there still remains the other half that is not conscious. This thinking, feeling, willing being that we call Man, 'in action how like an angel, in apprehension how like a god', has another side to his nature that is dark to himself as well as to those about him. It is as it were submerged; it does not enter into the visible picture at all. And for this reason we are apt almost to forget its existence. The conscious life is the life that counts; the conscious state is the dominating state at any given moment.

But, on the other hand, we appreciate the immense importance of the Unconscious, when we re-

member that in it is deposited the whole of the man's past, except just so far as any particular item of that past, a past sensation, or a past emotion, or a past idea or complex of ideas, is called up into the present. We are always under a temptation to think of the unconscious as inert and dead; but it is really very much the reverse. We understand how much, when we remember that every present thought and every present action has the whole momentum of the past behind it. It is the past that has made both the man's larger self and his smaller self what they are.

This huge deposit of the past, made up of items as countless as the sand upon the seashore, is really the moving factor, even at times when it does not consciously enter into consideration at all. If we are to take Shakespeare's ' 'Tis in ourselves that we are thus or thus', then it is the past that has had the making of 'ourselves'. The succession of conscious states is what we call our 'life'. But after all what a small proportion they are of our real life! What a small proportion they are of that formative process that is constantly going on in each one of us! I said in my book that the reservoir within us of past thoughts and past emotions and of the moral effects of past actions is not only a storehouse but also a workshop. It is none the less a workshop because the work is done in the dark. These heaped up experiences, these countless films (as it were) deposited one on the top of another,

Thick as autumnal leaves, that strew the brooks
In Vallombrosa,

are active and not passive; every one of them retains some subtle power of influencing the others; and many of them do as a matter of fact influence others. We know that this is so, because the principles and ideas and emotions that go down into the depths, when they return to the surface as many of them do, return in a different shape from that in which they went down. Their sharp edges are worn off; they have entered into new combinations; they undergo as it were a chemical change by coming in contact with each other.

All this applies to the smaller Self no less than to the larger. That central unifying principle, the *umbilicus* of our being, like the rest of our nature, is as much beneath the board as aboveboard; it too has a large section that is hidden out of sight. It too consists not of present states alone but of a continuous chain of past states culminating in the present. Only the smallest portion of this chain is at any given moment active in consciousness. And yet this conscious portion cannot be isolated; its whole history lies behind it; and it is what it is as the net result of its history.

So far I have been speaking of the individual life as a whole, of the self in its simplicity, without specifying any particular sphere of its action. But the rest of what I have to say is concerned with such

a sphere, the special sphere of religion. I have said something about the development of conscience, the moral sense and the moral law. The life of religion brings in another new factor, the relation of the soul to God. In the order of evolution this is still further removed from the condition of the beasts, 'a crowning of the edifice'; though in the order of logic the religious life, once gained, becomes dominant and supreme, and supplies a basis for character as a whole. The first germs of religion probably existed side by side with the first germs of the conception of morals and duty. This latter conception arose, as we may imagine, out of the relation of the individual to the family and the tribe. Morality had its root in the action required by the interest of the smaller or larger society to which the individual belonged. The sanctions of morality were built up by the praise and blame which naturally encouraged certain actions and discouraged others. But from the first man was also conscious of mysterious unseen powers around him, and by degrees he came to associate his success or failure with the approval of these Powers. We recall that happy comparison which Bacon uses:—

They that deny a *God*, destroy Mans Nobility: For certainly, Man is of Kinne to the Beasts, by his Body; And if, he be not of Kinne to *God*, by his Spirit, he is a Base and Ignoble Creature. It destroies likewise Magnanimity, and the Raising of Humane Nature: For take an Example of a Dog;

And mark what a Generosity, and Courage he will put on, when he findes himselfe maintained, by a Man; who to him is in stead of a *God*, or *Melior Natura*: which courage is manifestly such, as that Creature, without that Confidence, of a better Nature, then his owne, could never attaine. So Man, when he resteth and assureth himselfe, upon divine Protection, and Favour, gathereth a Force and Faith; which Humane Nature, in it selfe, could not obtaine (Bacon's *Essays*, ed. Aldis Wright, p. 66 f.).

Thus there grew up the sense of communion with God. And what is the nature of this communion? How is it carried on? If we take the average of mankind, even among those who are genuinely religious, the seeking after communion with God is a conscious act. The impulse of prayer, the throwing upon God the burden of care and anxiety, the aspiration after better things, the imploring of divine assistance, are all conscious and deliberate. But what of the Divine side in this communion? What of the answers to prayer? To the average man they do not come directly and consciously. There is no sound as of a rushing mighty wind; there are no cloven tongues as of fire. The man finds that he *has* what he wants and what he has asked for; his strength *is* proportioned to his need; he *does* have joy and peace in believing. And he knows that this is due to no efforts of his own, but to some subtle movement in the depths of his being. He repeats to himself the old prophetic word, 'Not

by might, nor by power, but by my spirit, saith the Lord of hosts' (Zech. iv. 6).

I have spoken of the forming of character, and I am far from wishing to depreciate the conscious processes which go to the forming of character; the lessons of early youth, the maturer studies of manhood,

All saws of books, all forms, all pressures (i. e.
impressions) past,

the inward debate and struggle with self, the reasoned working out of principle, and the holding up before the mind of principle previously accepted and acknowledged. But when the amplest allowance has been made for such present influences as these, how much remains that does not belong to the present or to conscious processes at all! How much is due to underground workings of which we are not in the least aware!

I would lay stress upon the fact to which I have more than once called attention that such underground workings of which we are not aware are constantly going on. The impressions of the past are not lost because they are forgotten. Whether they are such as may sometimes be recalled, or whether they have lost all touch with consciousness so that they will never be recalled, still they are not dead but active; still they play round and through the inner self, and make it what it is. At any given moment the present, with all the con-

scious processes that enter into it, is a product of the past, and of the total past. The processes which issue in this result elude us completely, because they take place in a region that is hidden and dark to us; our methods of analysis cannot penetrate to it. We are reminded of that verse of Browning's, with its curious grammar, but distinct and impressive meaning:—

That one Face, far from vanish, rather grows,
Or decomposes but to recompose,
Become[s] my universe that feels and knows.

That indeed has reference to the vision of God, whereas we have only to do with the making of the Self; but in this too there go on processes of decomposition and recomposition behind the scenes; we live by what we see, and take by faith what we cannot see. When St. Paul used his remarkable phrase, 'Nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me' (Gal. ii. 20), and again when he speaks of his little children of whom he is in travail until Christ be formed in them (iv. 19), he in like manner does not profess to follow the process, but fixes his eye upon the result.

In my book I ventured to describe that hidden unconscious region, the 'subliminal self' as it is often called, as the proper and natural sphere of Divine influence upon the soul. Does not that correspond to our experience? Are we not sure that there *is* such Divine influence? And, if there is,

does not the greater part of it elude our consciousness? Does not St. Paul repeatedly imply that it works beneath the surface? Is it not just this that he means when he says, 'we know not how to pray as we ought; but the Spirit himself maketh intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered' (Rom. viii. 26) ?

It is true that in certain exceptional natures these secret workings come nearer to the surface than they do with others. In the Old Testament God is represented as speaking with Moses 'face to face, as a man speaketh unto his friend' (Ex. xxxiii. 11). There is an element of primitive realism in the expression; but I can well believe that the language is that of some prophet who had himself had a more vivid experience of God than falls to the lot of ordinary men. I should be inclined to say as much of the Prophets generally when they claim 'The Lord spake unto me saying', or when they set down a sort of dialogue between God and themselves (e. g. Is. vi. 5-13; Jer. i. 4-10, xv. 15-21, &c.). Here again the experience is so vivid that it rises up into consciousness to a degree that we cannot parallel from ourselves. I would say the same of other latter-day saints. There are doubtless many degrees of communion; and the measure that we should apply to these degrees is the extent to which they enter into consciousness. But in ordinary experience the communion that I speak of is usually sub- or unconscious; and even in excep-

tional experience, it begins in the sub- or unconscious region and gradually expands upwards and outwards.

Some of my hearers may remember, in the volume of *Cambridge Theological Essays* (1905), an essay by Canon J. M. Wilson of Worcester on 'The Idea of Revelation, in the light of modern knowledge and research'. In reviewing this essay, I rather felt compelled to take exception to the strong antithesis that was drawn between two ways of conceiving of Revelation, the one subjective and internal, the other objective and external; as if these conflicting modes of conception seriously competed with each other at the present time. I thought we were sufficiently agreed that the method of Divine revelation to man was through the action of the Spirit of God upon the human spirit and human faculties of apprehension. But all that side of the antithesis seemed to me to be stated by Canon Wilson exceedingly well. I will quote a paragraph which treats of the subjective or internal method of Revelation on the broadest possible scale.

We may . . . regard it [the universe] as essentially one continuous whole, in which, from hidden sources of life within, which we call Divine, mysterious and ordered movements spring up, progressing towards some remote end. Such a development in the spheres of matter and of physical life is popularly called Evolution; in that of the intellect it is called Knowledge; and in the realm

of conscience and will it may be called Revelation, though perhaps there is no real distinction. Revelation, from this point of view, is regarded as the growth of evolution of the Divine Life, and of the knowledge of its own nature, in the human race (*op. cit.*, p. 224).

Canon Wilson is treating of 'movements', where hitherto we have been concerned rather with individuals. But it is the Divine action upon individuals which goes to make a movement. Accordingly, when Canon Wilson speaks of 'hidden sources of life within, which we call Divine', I feel justified in translating this as applying to the 'subliminal states' or 'subliminal self' of elect servants of God. The phrase is convenient, and in itself it is quite harmless; if pernicious meanings have been read into it, they can be put aside.

It is true that the prophetic utterances were essentially public. But the publicity consisted in proclaiming from the housetops secrets whispered to them in the inner chambers. It was the special privilege of the prophets that they were admitted to the inner counsels of God. And the way in which they were admitted to them was, not that they beheld any visible writing upon the wall, but that 'impulses of deeper birth' came to them—impulses deeper and more searching than fall to the lot of common men.

And yet there is an analogy between their experience and ours. The Spirit spoke to them by

acting upon and through the inner faculties and processes of their being. And it is in the same manner and through the same channels that He speaks to us. There is no fundamental difference between the psychology of St. Paul and St. John and that of modern times. It would in no way disturb their language or meaning if we were to insert the 'subliminal self' as the medium of Divine inspiration and Divine indwelling.

And that which was true of the servants—the prophets and holy men of old—was true also of the Son. Even with Him, in His incarnate nature, Divine inspiration and Divine indwelling was not essentially different in the mode and region of its working. If I am not mistaken, this inquiry on which we have been engaged will help us to see more clearly wherein lies the likeness and wherein the unlikeness between Christ and ourselves.

In my book I emphasized the likeness in a way that has seemed to some—and perhaps naturally seemed—to need qualification. I said: 'The Life of our Lord, so far as it was visible, was a strictly human life; He was, as the Creeds teach, "very Man"; there is nothing to prevent us from speaking of this human life of His just as we should speak of the life of one of ourselves'. I used the present tense, but I really had in view the historical Life. I was thinking of the impression that would have been made on one of us if we had met the Prophet of Nazareth from day to day in the streets of

Capernaum. We should have thought of Him as the Prophet of Nazareth; and it would at least have taken some time before we suspected that He was more than this. The public ministry was drawing to its close before St. Peter made his great confession, although for months he had lived at his Master's side. That was one aspect, the aspect of likeness; but now I must speak of the complementary aspect of unlikeness.

If we believe that there is but one God, then we must also believe that there is but one Divine. There are not two kinds of Divinity or Deity; there is but one kind. If, or in so far as, the Holy Spirit may be said to dwell in our hearts, it was the same Holy Spirit who dwelt in Christ. The difference was not in the essence, nor yet in the mode or sphere, of the indwelling, but *in the relation of the indwelling to the Person*. And when I say the Person, I mean the whole Person—each several organ and faculty—but especially the central core of Personality, the inner, controlling, and commanding Person. There are Divine influences at work within ourselves; and those influences touch more lightly or less lightly upon the Person, but they do not *hold and possess* it, as the Deity within Him *held and possessed* the Person of the incarnate Christ.

There is the chasm, which we may conceive filled, but which, as a matter of fact, never is filled. If we take the high-water mark that human language has ever reached, that astonishing saying of

St. Paul's 'Nevertheless I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me', there, no doubt, the Apostle is speaking of an ideal which he can conceive realized, though it never has been, and never will be, completely realized. Our human experience falls far short of it. If we could conceive of it as realized we should say, not that there were two Gods, but that there were two Incarnations.

I have tried to use all the precision of language that I can. It is demanded of me; and I desire, to the utmost of my power, to meet the demand. But this is the furthest point to which I think that we can profitably go. I would not myself wantonly go even so far as this. But what has been done once will not need to be done again.

III
RETROSPECT

III

RETROSPECT

THE foregoing lectures were delivered in November, 1910, and they might have been published by the beginning of the year. But, except from my friend Professor H. R. Mackintosh, to whom reference has been made above (page 4), neither they nor my book on *Christologies*, to which they formed a sort of continuation, had as yet passed through the ordeal of criticism by a professed philosopher. I was promised such a criticism, and I looked forward to it with especial interest, because I regarded whatever there was of novelty in the book and in the lectures as submitted in the first instance to the philosophers. Not until an opinion had been obtained from them could I feel any security that what I had written was deserving of the attention of a wider public. I did not of course expect a direct endorsement, but the preliminary objections might be too great to be overcome.

I knew that I was trespassing off my own proper ground. The only excuse that could be made, was that it was trespassing in pursuit of game started on the theological side of the hedge. I thought that perhaps excuse enough, because I was sure that

questions like those I have raised would some day come up for discussion, and it seemed well to make a beginning, however modest that beginning might be.

As I am writing now (February, 1911) I have had sufficient philosophical criticism to enable me to take my bearings; and, without anticipating the result, I feel that I ought at least to complete the case stated in *Christologies* to the extent to which these lectures may be said to complete it.

I will come back quickly to the philosophical questions which are the most important that I have now to deal with. But as I have the opportunity of looking back over the ground traversed in my book, I will avail myself of it to try to correct one or two incidental points that seem to need correction. Those writers are to be envied who, with a sharp and clear recollection of all the facts that have to be embraced and summarised, and with the pen wielded by a flexible and dexterous hand, set down exactly what they mean, neither less nor more. But it is too easy, either from defective memory or from defective skill, to let the scales of justice incline unduly to the one side or to the other. It is a matter of very real regret to me that in one or two personal references, either to schools or to individuals, I should have seemed to do injustice that was far from my intention. The passage about the doctrine or theory of Kenosis and

its maintainers (*Christologies*, pp. 71-8) has been described as 'severe'; and I am the more sorry that it should present itself in this light because I myself may be thought to preach a Kenotic doctrine. It would ill become me to impute blame to those who, at the most, were only engaged as I am myself in 'experimental thinking'. Nothing could be further from my intention than to revive what I hope I may call forgotten controversies. The mellowing effect of time has passed over these, and I hope that the kindly treatment of this part of my own book by reviewers will show how little tendency there is to take hold of vulnerable points or to re-open old sores. Still I do not acquit myself of imperfect memory and insufficient stress on *caveats* and disclaimers that I ought to have remembered (especially, I may say, Bishop Gore's *Dissertations*, pp. 94-97, 179-201). So far as my own view of Kenotic theory is concerned, I am only anxious that it should be kept as much as possible within general terms; I do not want it to be allowed to harden into a system of scholastic or quasi-scholastic definitions. When St. Paul wrote to the Philippians, he was not using the language of doctrine but of morals of wide imaginative outlook, and the more we can follow his example the better.

Another regret that I have is that I should have been thought to do injustice to a writer for whom I have a sincere respect and regard, Professor

Wilhelm Herrmann, of Marburg (*op. cit.*, pp. 107 ff.). I had hoped that the opening sentences of my reference to him would be taken to cover and qualify all that followed. I am glad to see that they were so taken by my reviewer in the *Oxford Magazine*. And, to say truth, the criticism which followed was not meant to be read too literally and seriously. I was quite aware of the essential merits of that which I was criticising. Here, too, I was dealing with a phase of controversy which I hoped might be regarded as past and done with, and to which it was possible to look back with something of a smile. Apart from this, I gather from my friend Professor Peake—one of the most learned of bibliographers—that my criticisms were based upon an old translation which the publishers had afterwards superseded.

In the course of the paragraph relating to Herrmann there occurs an allusion to the greatest of the Reformers for which one of my own best friends rebukes me. Since my undergraduate days, when I first read Carlyle's *Lectures on Heroes*, I have been an admirer of Luther, and I would not for a great deal say anything really disrespectful of him.¹ I hardly think that what I wrote even hinted at anything of the kind. But the context, if it were taken more seriously than it was meant, might also give to the allusion a colour that was not intended.

¹I am not prepared to express an opinion on the last important phase of the Luther controversy started by Père Denifle's *Luther u. Luthertum* (Band i. 1904).

The above are incidental personalities that did not affect my main argument. The only other point to which I think that I need refer here is also independent of the main argument, though it belongs to a portion of my book which means much to me. I included in the volume a discussion which I thought would help to explain the foundation on which it rested and at the same time continued a train of thought in a previous publication.¹ The *Hibbert Journal* for October, 1910, p. 203, criticised this with some point, if also with some condescension. The subject was the continuity of Christian thought in the past and in the present. All that I would wish to say about it now is that it may be regarded from two points of view, religious or scientific. In the one case the leading idea is that of the Providential order; we think of the Divine guidance of the Church manifested down the centuries, and we expect to find congruity between its different parts. In the other case the leading idea is evolution; and that too is a continuous process; one part does not contradict another, but grows naturally out of it; the type is preserved, though it is steadily developed. In my book, especially in the Preface, I wrote from the point of view that I have called religious. There is, however, the scientific standpoint as well. For myself, I regard the

¹ Chapter on 'Symbolism', taking up *The Life of Christ in Recent Research* (1907). The passages involved were pp. 234-9, and Preface p. vi. f.

two as different aspects of the same thing. In the one aspect it is God,

‘Existent behind all laws, who made them and, lo, they are!’

In the other aspect it is law, as the expression of the will of God. Any one may make his choice between these two modes of presentation, or use at one time one and at another time the other according to his context. They do not contradict, but rather supplement, each other.

The reception of my book in the non-philosophical portion of the public Press had been all, and more than all, that I could hope for. I have always had a scruple about thanking my reviewers, because to do so might seem to make a personal matter of it and to suggest that their verdicts ‘went by favour’. But I could not help being struck and touched by the generally sympathetic treatment accorded to me. I have lived long enough to see a great improvement in this respect, in the care with which a writer’s views are reproduced and the insight and considerateness with which his aims are appreciated. This extends even to those to whom the particular point of view is more or less uncongenial. I have myself reaped the full benefit from this advance, and I cannot forget it.

But I awaited with especial interest the judgement that would come sooner or later from the side of philosophy. I have said that I think of Professor

H. R. Mackintosh as philosopher as well as theologian; and his very full review of me in two successive numbers in the *Expository Times* (vol. xxi, pp. 486 ff., 553 ff.) was quite humbling in its kindness. I would venture to ask any one who desires to follow out the subject further than the point to which I have brought it to refer to these two articles. They will see there the views which I have been trying to commend presented at their very best, except perhaps at a single point in regard to which I am responsible. It will be borne in mind that the articles are a review of my *book*, and that the writer had not before him the further material and correction contained in the lectures that I am now publishing. It was one of the chief objects of those lectures to remove the particular misunderstanding of which I have just spoken (see pp. 6-8).

I have read over again, with a view to this chapter, the three objections to my theory stated by Professor Mackintosh, *op. cit.*, pp. 556-8. The first is the attribution of superiority to the unconscious. All my philosophical critics have laid stress upon this. When Mr. J. K. Mozley did so in the *Cambridge Review*, I replied disclaiming the intention to assert such superiority. And it is true that I did not intend to assert it. But I can now see that it was at least very natural that my critics should think otherwise; and I have tried to explain (*loc. cit.*) how it was that I came to give this impression. It was never distinctly and deliberately before my

mind. But I was feeling my way; and I was feeling my way along the particular line which my argument followed. I had no idea of challenging what I may call the received or current psychology, except so far as it was directly affected by the fuller recognition of the sub- and unconscious. I did not mean to depreciate the conscious states. I did not mean to question the processes commonly referred to them. I hope that in the second of these lectures I have emphasized the importance of those states in a way that may be sufficient to clear me of this suspicion. From the point of view of the Self, and the responsibility of the Self and the formation of Character, they are all-important. And I do not wish to describe them as acting otherwise than my critics would themselves. I would only seek to enhance the *relative* importance of the sub- and unconscious states. It seems to me that in the past these states have been too much left out of sight, simply because the mind has not been allowed to dwell sufficiently upon them. The great outstanding fact which elevates them in the mental scale is the fact that in a sub- or unconscious form they contain the whole deposit of a man's past. They contain, not only all the stores of memory, but all the effects of those stores upon the roots of Self and of Character.

I desire to correct my first way of stating the case (as it is expressed in *Christologies*) by not laying so much stress upon the 'threshold' or 'dividing-

line' between the conscious and the unconscious. It may in fact be treated as only imaginary, put in to help clearness of presentation. I am not sorry that I made use of such language for that reason. At the early stages of many a process of exposition we do put in dividing lines, or make them blacker than they really are, just for this practical purpose of impressing them upon the mind. When they have served this purpose they can be rubbed out again. And in that sense I shall be quite content to rub out, or make much fainter, a good deal of the imagery that I employed at first for temporary convenience. There is a perpetual uprising of that which is generated below into the region above; and it is only in this upper region that it attains to its fullest and best expression—fullest and best at least from the point of view of human life and personality. All that I willingly admit; and I hope that the admission may help to reconcile Professor Mackintosh and others to some of the things that in my first statement were a stumbling-block to them.

I think of Professor Mackintosh and Mr. Mozley as philosophical theologians; in the *Oxford Magazine* for November 24, 1910, I received my first criticism from a philosopher proper. The initials attached to it were those of a name well known and honoured in Oxford; it was just the name that I should wish to see attached to a review of any quasi-philosophical work of mine. The contents were mainly critical, but the criticism could not

have been more kindly or considerately done. The details of it seemed to me to fall under two heads. They covered the whole ground of my book; but some of them seemed to touch the heart of it, while others did not. My reviewer dwelt from time to time on interesting questions as they arose—questions that might quite well affect the impression formed of the book and of its writer, but which were not exactly vital to the particular theory advocated. For instance, the reviewer desiderated a clearer statement of my conception of the place of authority in religion. I would gladly give this as far as I can. I may refer to a paper on 'Authority in Belief and Practice' read by me at the Swansea Church Congress in 1909. It may be enough to say here that I do not regard any authority as exempt from criticism; and I should never wish to shelter myself behind authority. But I do not regard this as excluding the endeavour to maintain a loyal continuity between the teaching of the Church and any private teaching of my own.

My reviewer devoted considerable space to another subject which has indeed a certain interest in itself, but which I should have thought had a very secondary bearing upon the main issue. This is the question of the appeal to the 'expert', the exact definition of an expert, and the question how far T. H. Green is to be regarded as an expert in philosophy and theology. On this last point I do not think I could quite agree that 'in no sense in

which he [Green] could be called a first-hand philosopher was he a second-hand theologian'. Green was certainly a fresh and first-hand thinker on the subject of religion. But his interpretation of the Bible and his reconstruction of the historical course of the beginnings of Christianity depended to a large extent on data derived from outside. As I said in my book, they rested for the most part on the theories and criticisms of Strauss and Baur. It was in that sense that I described them as second-hand. I can well believe that Green was not exactly what we should call an all-round philosopher, equally armed at all points of the history and principles of philosophy. But I do not know that any reference that I made to him depended upon the assumption that he was.

So far as my own appeal to 'experts' in philosophy is concerned, if we are to describe it by that name, I do not suppose that I could stand a very severe cross-examination: in particular, if I were asked why I mentioned the names I did in preference to others, my reasons would not be thought very satisfactory. I mentioned them chiefly because of their influence upon the genesis of my own thought. If I referred to F. W. H. Myers, it was not that I considered him a philosopher in the strict sense at all; I did not think of him in that light any more than I should think of myself; but he had a share in setting me upon the track which I followed. Professor William James would count for

rather more than this. But, if I were pressed, I do not think that I expected more help from him than such as his name might give me in asking for a hearing. I gather that my reviewer would criticise Professor James almost as much as he would me. But I quite agree that anything either of us might have to say must stand strictly upon its own merits.

One little flaw which the reviewer notes in my book I believe to have been taken over from Myers or James. He points out that the phrase 'subliminal consciousness' is self-contradictory; so far as the state is subliminal it is not conscious. I was really, I think, alive to this (see *Christologies*, p. 138 n.). I have not looked very carefully, but I believe that the phrase 'subliminal consciousness' only occurs twice in my book—once in a quotation from James, and once in what is practically a paraphrase of Myers. In any case it is a survival, and ought to be corrected; the 'subliminal self' is, I should say, all right, but 'subliminal consciousness' is a contradiction.

On all these points I do not feel that the criticism goes very deep. There remain two which I recognise as more serious. The consideration of these two carries me on to another review from the side of philosophy, which appeared in the *Hibbert Journal* for January, 1911, from the pen of Dr. C. F. D'Arcy, Bishop of Ossory [now Bishop-Elect of Down, Connor, and Dromore]. Here again, although the criticism is adverse, I have every reason

to thank the Bishop for treating my book so seriously and so kindly. The two reviews—this and that in the *Oxford Magazine*—really turn upon the same fundamental points, and I may perhaps be allowed to take them together.

One of these points is that of which I have already spoken—the tendency which my book betrayed to exalt the sub- and unconscious states above the conscious. I admit that the charge is not quite without foundation so far as the book is concerned. I admit that my language in several places naturally suggested the criticism. At the same time I have explained that, so far as it did so, it did not represent my real intention, and I have tried in the preceding lectures and in this chapter to make clear what my full intention really was. I hope that at this stage I need not say more.

The other objection cuts deeper; indeed it is the one objection that I confess really comes home to me. This is the objection to the use that I have made of metaphor, and especially (in Dr. D'Arcy's words) of 'spatial and material' metaphor.

Dr. D'Arcy presents this objection in what I cannot but think is a rather extreme form. His net includes, as will be seen, not only me but many others besides me—and notably Professor James. He writes as follows:—

Mental facts of all kinds, feelings, thoughts, impulses, volitions, are not in space. They are in time only. The stream of consciousness, as we call

it, has no *place*, no *locus*. If the subconscious be mental in its nature, how, then, does it exist?

It is startling to reflect that all the language which psychologists have allowed themselves to use in connexion with this subject is daringly, almost outrageously, spatial and material. The same statement may be made of their account of normal psychical experiences. They speak of the *field* of consciousness, of the *centre* and of the *margin*. But there is no field, no centre, no margin in consciousness. These images are all spatial, and, in relation to consciousness, there is nothing so important about them as their utter unfitness to express the facts. (H. J., p. 242.)

This is sweeping indeed. But how far is it true? 'Mental facts of all kinds, feelings, thoughts, impulses, volitions, are not in space.' But surely they are *ours*, and *we* are in space; we carry them about with us; they are where we are, and they are not where we are not. How then can they help being in space?

And further, the language criticised is very widely current; people use it, and it conveys a meaning to them. If it were so utterly remote from reality, how does it come to have the vogue that it has?

I will venture to say that it is impossible to avoid using spatial and material metaphor in contexts of this kind. Dr. D'Arcy himself shall be my witness. Here, for instance, are three consecutive sentences of his:—

It would seem, then, that the contents of consciousness are, in truth, inexhaustible. Every

change in experience adds a new quality, and all past experiences have in some way contributed to the whole. Thus our conscious experience contains, in addition to elements which are clear and obvious, others which are extremely subtle and evasive, but which can, in fitting circumstances, become the means of wonderful constructions and reconstructions (p. 244).

I should have thought that these sentences literally bristled with spatial and material metaphors. Why should it be any worse to speak of the 'field of consciousness' than of the 'contents of consciousness'? Why is it wrong to speak of it as having centre or margin, but right to speak of it as containing or receiving additions, of its elements clear and evasive, of its constructions and reconstructions? There is perhaps a little difference in degree, but none in kind.

In our present experience the soul is confined within the body. It is in some mysterious way related to the body; it acts upon the body, and the body reacts upon it. The nature of this action and reaction is at the present time being keenly investigated; and, as the investigation progresses, the use of language may be expected to become more accurate. But as things stand at present we cannot afford to suppress our instincts; we cannot debar ourselves from employing the only means we have of expressing our thoughts and communicating them to others. So long as our meaning is intelligible to others and recognized by them as cor-

responding to experiences of their own, our language fulfils a legitimate purpose.

The Bishop of Ossory has another passage which is an even more direct negation of the position taken up in the preceding lectures:—

It is the symbolical representation of the self as a mathematical point or material atom occupying a central position in the midst of its experiences, instead of, as it truly is, the concrete synthesis of them all, and their containing principle, which has misled thought on this subject. Or, rather, it is this false view of the self, together with the whole range of symbolical spatial representations by means of which we are in the habit of examining our mental states (p. 244).

If our mental processes are not in space at all, no doubt there is an end of the matter. But I should have thought that there was just as much an end of 'the concrete synthesis and containing principle' as of the 'mathematical point or material atom'. The question rather seems to me to be which of these two modes of expression corresponds best with the facts and is the most helpful in discussion. I had not, of course, exactly used the phrase 'a mathematical point or material atom'; but the metaphors I had used were practically equivalent to these, and I am quite willing to accept them as representing my views. More strictly, I should say that they represent *half* my views; for I do not really feel called upon to deny the alternative. I had in fact been led to think that the common use of language

obliges us to recognize two distinct senses of the word Self, a larger and a smaller, an inner and an outer. The larger self may well correspond to the 'synthesis of experiences'; it is not only a synthesis of experiences but a synthesis of faculties; it includes the whole man, body and soul. But when we come to the 'containing principle', there seems to me to be some ambiguity. The word 'principle' suggests something very like what I have in my mind; but 'synthesis' and 'containing' do not seem to go well with this. We want to distinguish between the unity and that which unifies. My reason for marking off an inner or smaller self was precisely in order to explain, or describe more exactly, what it is that causes the unity.

We are conscious within ourselves of a number of faculties which are distinct from each other and to which we give separate names, such as thinking, feeling, and willing. We have as good reason, or nearly as good reason, for distinguishing these as we have for distinguishing the bodily organs, foot and hand and eye. The difference is that the latter are visible and tangible, whereas the former are not. So far the bodily organs have an advantage in concreteness and definiteness over the mental. But if instead of looking at them from the side of appeal to the senses, we look at them rather from the side of diversity of function, in this respect they are on the same level. We must therefore think of them as separate though they are not physically separate.

The will-function, the thought-function, and the feeling-function are as distinct from each other as hearing, seeing, and smelling.

Now the organs of the body are at once separate and inter-connected; apart from the inter-connexion and that which causes the inter-connexion, they would be so much inert matter. But then the principle of life runs through them, and makes them act together or cease from acting; and they do this, under normal conditions, in complete harmony, not in the least clashing or colliding with each other. And the same holds good of the mental faculties; they too are at once functionally distinct and yet vitally inter-connected.

But then, above the parts or organs of the body and above the parts or faculties of the mind, there is as it were enthroned at the centre—it is of course a purely figurative mode of speaking to describe it in these terms, but the figure comes so spontaneously and naturally that we can hardly help having recourse to it—a *something* which governs and controls all these inferior agencies. It is its special function to govern, control and unify. And that function is so important that it seems to deserve a separate and special name. That is why I submit that we need the conception of a smaller and inner self. It is distinct from the organs and faculties. The hand is not included in it, though it moves the hand; the thinking process is not included in it, though it sets in motion the thought. It causes

to act, or to cease from acting, every part of the larger self. There is nothing in a name, and it does not matter what this commanding principle is called —whether an inner self or anything else; but I do contend that it deserves, and ought to have, a name of its own. This usage is at least clear and unmistakable, whereas to speak of a 'synthesis or containing principle' is at once inadequate and lends itself to confusion. It is inadequate, because it does not express, and hardly even suggests, that active command and control, that unifying and organizing power, which is an essential element in the self. And it is misleading, because it is ambiguous and attempts to make a single phrase cover distinct things.

I cannot help asking myself what the result would be if the Bishop of Ossory were to try to paraphrase the passage that I quoted from *Othello* in terms of his philosophy. The passage is one that is perfectly intelligible to the plain man; he recognizes at once its fitness to describe the processes of which he is conscious. He understands what is meant both by the 'gardener' and the 'garden'. And if we paraphrase these as the 'inner' and 'outer' self, still he would understand, and I think that he would find a certain amount of light thrown upon the workings of his own mind. But if for the 'gardener' we substitute a 'synthesis and containing principle of experiences', we have indeed an impressive phrase, but one that is somewhat cumbrous to manipulate and that only tends to

obscure the distinction, which should certainly be observed, between the gardener and the garden. For the garden is the experiences, and the gardener is the sum or synthesis of the experiences—which does not carry us much further. A ‘sum’ or ‘synthesis’ could hardly be said to ‘plant, or weed up, nettles or lettuce or thyme’.

This is what I should have to say in reply to that part of Bishop D’Arcy’s criticism which is concerned (by anticipation) with that theory of the Self which I have just been expounding. But I must add a few words upon the effect of his and other criticisms on the original thesis which has led to this discussion.

It was perhaps a bolder hypothesis than I at first realised to speak of a *locus* of the operations of the Holy Spirit or of the Divine in man. I have not indeed seen my way to agree with Dr. D’Arcy in the broad proposition that ‘mental processes are not in space’. Under present conditions at least they are in space; they are so bound up with the body that they cannot be wholly detached from it. The common language and experience of mankind so associates the workings of the mind with ideas of locality that we cannot afford to dispense with them. They point to something distinctive in the experience which at present it seems difficult to express in any other way. We must wait until philosophers have analysed these local ideas more closely. At the same time I am ready to admit that they have to be discounted, and the local element in them in

particular has to be discounted. What precisely remains after this has been done is perhaps an open question.

And yet, while I should agree that the local element in this symbolic language of locality has to be discounted, and although I should maintain that abstention from the use of this symbolic language carried with it a certain loss, I still believe that it is possible to restate the main proposition that I had laid down without bringing in the idea of locality; and I still believe that the psychology which lays stress upon the subconscious and the unconscious has matter of value to contribute to us.

I do not say that the conscious processes of the human mind are inferior to the sub- and unconscious. On the contrary, I believe that in the part which they play in the formation of character they are distinctly higher. The conscious processes may be said to constitute the continuous thread of the man's self in a sense in which nothing else about him constitutes it. But, none the less, the sub- and unconscious processes play an important part of their own—a part much more important than (to the best of my belief) had been recognised until a short time ago.

The point at which I suppose this will be most clearly seen is in the fact that these sub- and unconscious states contain the whole deposit of the man's past. 'Deposit' is another material metaphor, and as such it too has to be discounted, but I do not see

that we can help using it. And it is, I conceive, another important thing to realise, that all this accumulated deposit, no less than the conscious states, is and (throughout the life of the individual in whom it is found) always has been alive.

The proof that it is so lies in the fact that these past experiences, when they return into consciousness, always return with a certain amount of alteration. A process of decomposition and recombination has taken place in them; they never come back to consciousness in the precise form in which they left it. They have been as much affected by the other contents of that dark storehouse as they are by the other contents of consciousness which meet them in the full light of day.

That is one important condition which has to be remembered. And another is, that within these same states of sub- and unconsciousness spiritual forces are at work just as much as in the waking man. Some kinds of spiritual influence seem to be even more active under these unknown conditions than they are under those that are known.


I have always taken as typical of these the answers that we receive to prayer. These answers appear to me to work, in great part if not altogether, through channels and in ways that the reflective consciousness cannot follow. I would go further, and say that under the same dim conditions a whole life is lived which, although it is seen only in its effects, forms a most important part of religious

experience. In the case of the Christian it is, if not all, yet a main constituent in that life which St. Paul describes as 'hid with Christ in God'.

That, I say, is the experience of the Christian. And must there not have been something analogous to it in the incarnate experience of Christ Himself? It was on this analogy that I took my stand and from which I tried to draw some inferences in a tentative way.

My philosophy has been criticised; and I am free to confess that, if I could have my time over again, I should write—or try to write—somewhat differently. I should not deal so freely in metaphor. Not that I can altogether repent even of this; for to have passed through this metaphorical stage, I believe has been a help to me, whatever it might be to others. I cannot help thinking that there are some gaps and weak points in the philosophical position. I have ventured to indicate some of these. And nothing would rejoice me more than if the philosophers themselves, or some of our own philosophically-minded theologians, would take up and work out in their own better way, these problems that I have clumsily adumbrated.¹ Theology, perhaps more than any other science, needs to receive contributions from all sides.

¹ I welcome very warmly the assistance and (in a measure) support that is given me by Dr. Caldecott in his contribution to the April number of the *Hibbert Journal*, 1911, pp. 641–644. I can avail myself of this help the more freely because I should answer all the interrogatories put to me in the sense desired.



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